The Notion of Linguistic Convention (saṁketa) in the Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa 427.22–431.9
PrabhācandraMāṇikyanandinJainismmeaningsaṁketasahaja-yogyatāśabdaarthavastu
Małgorzata B. Glinicka | Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia (AAV) 38 (2025) | Pages: 31–53DOI: https://doi.org/10.60018/AcAsVa.rsfz7727
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to define the nature and the role of linguistic convention in the Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa (PKM, “The Lotus-like Sun [revealing] Objects of Valid Cognition”), Prabhācandra’s (11th cent. ce) commentary on Māṇikyanandin’s Parīkṣâmukha (PĀ, “Introduction to [Logical] Analysis”), with particular reference to PĀ 3.100–101 (PKM 427.22–431.9). The problem of linguistic convention has been thoroughly discussed in Jaina philosophical literature, since it is one of the major factors of understanding the relationship between a word and its meaning, as well as a word and an object signified by the word. In order to reconstruct Prabhācandra’s view on this subject I will focus on the nature of this relationship – as presented in the PKM – that is characterised as “conventional”, having regard to the existing discussions in Jaina philosophy of language and trying to assess whether they are reflected in Prabhācandra’s deliberations. In this particular approach to the problem of linguistic convention, an important role is played by what is called yogyatā (“power”, “ability”, “compatibility of meaning”), of which an additional element of description is the adjective sahaja (“inherent”, “innate”). Tracing instances of the contextualisation of this concept in close connection with the problem of linguistic convention in Jaina philosophical literature and situating the whole complex issue against the background of other interdependent aspects of this nuanced and multifaceted theory of meaning will form the pivotal part of the analysis.
